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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final decree in a domestic relations 
matter. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in making a 
property division which adjusted for the premarital debt and 
equity, and equally divided the marital property? The trial 
court's adjustment of the parties' property interests is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. Watson v. Watson, 837 P. 2d 1, 5 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (citation omitted). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding wife 
a nominal amount of permanent alimony, where the evidence showed 
she was unable to work or to support herself, and the husband was 
awarded the parties' income producing assets? The trial court's 
award of alimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Brienholt v. 
Brienholt. 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the 
farm property and water shares to Husband, where there was 
competent evidence presented at trial to support the award. Wife 
does not challenge Interveners' statement that the standard of 
review is abuse of discretion. 
4. Was the finding that Intervenors were bound by a rental 
agreement clearly erroneous, where evidence of the agreement and 
debt was admitted without objection? Contrary to Intervenors' 
assertion, this issue is not reviewed for correctness. "The issue 
of whether a contract exists may present both questions of law and 
fact, depending on the nature of the claims raised." Cal Wadsworth 
Const, v. City of St. George, 865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Ct. App. 1993), 
affirmed, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995). The issue here was whether 
the parties intended the contract to be binding. Such matters are 
factual, and the trial court's finding should be affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous. Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Heriford, 772 
P.2d 466, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The correctness of the trial 
court's implied finding that the contract was not abandoned should 
also be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Timpanogos Highlands, 
Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481, 484-85 (Utah 1975). This case also 
presents an issue as to whether the parties abandoned the contract. 
This issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). 
2 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Ann. § 30-3-5(7-9) (Supp. 1997) states: 
(a) The court shall consider at least 
the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and 
needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capaci-
ty or ability to produce 
income; 
(iii)the ability of the payor spouse 
to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of 
the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should 
look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, 
in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a) . However, the 
court shall consider all relevant 
facts and equitable principles and 
may, in its discretion, base alimony 
on the standard of living that 
existed at the time of trial. In 
marriages of short duration, when no 
children have been conceived or born 
during the marriage, the court may 
consider the standard of living that 
existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate 
circumstances, attempt to equalize 
the parties' respective standards of 
living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration 
dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of 
the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall 
be considered in dividing the mari-
tal property and in determining the 
amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly 
enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the 
court may make a compensating ad-
justment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. 
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(f) In determining alimony when a mar-
riage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived 
or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider restoring each 
party to the condition which existed 
at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing juris-
diction to make substantive 
changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a 
substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable 
at the time of the divorce, 
(ii) The court may not modify 
alimony or issue a new order 
for alimony to address needs of 
the recipient that did not 
exist at the time the decree 
was entered, unless the court 
finds extenuating circumstances 
that justify that action, 
(iii) In determining alimony, 
the income of any subse-
quent spouse of the payor 
may not be considered, 
except as provided in 
this subsection. 
(A) The court may consider 
the subsequent spouse's 
financial ability to 
share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider 
the income of a subse-
quent spouse if the court 
finds that the payor's 
improper conduct justi-
fies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a 
duration longer than the number of 
years that the marriage existed 
unless, at any time prior to termi-
nation of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that 
justify the payment of alimony for a 
longer period of time. 
Unless a decree of divorce specifically 
provides otherwise, any order of the 
court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse automatically terminates 
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upon the remarriage of that former 
spouse• However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, 
payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to 
the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse terminates 
upon establishment by the party paying 
alimony that the former spouse is cohabi-
tating with another person. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. This is an appeal from a property 
division in a divorce case. The interveners joined to protect 
their claims to land and water stock used by the couple. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below. Elaine 
Broderick ("Wife") filed her complaint for divorce on September 14, 
1994. (R. 3-1.J1 Boyd E. Broderick ("Husband") answered on 
October 5, 1994. (R. 8-7.) On February 28, 1995, Alma L. 
Broderick and Sephronia L. Broderick ("Intervenors"), who are 
Husband's parents, sought to intervene to protect their claimed 
interest in certain assets used by Husband and Wife. (R. 24.) 
Wife (R. 39) and Husband (R. 43) each stipulated to the 
intervention, and the motion was granted May 15, 1995. (R. 55.) 
The Intervenors filed a complaint in intervention. (R. 53-
52.) Husband answered and essentially admitted the Intervenors' 
1
 The documents are assembled in the record in reverse 
chronological order, and as a result the numbering added by the 
clerk in preparation for appeal is in reverse order on each 
document. 
S 
allegations. (R. 51-50.) Wife answered and denied most of the 
interveners' allegations. (R. 47-45, 62-60.) 
The matter was tried to the court on October 13, 1995. (R. 
75-73.) Husband did not contest the granting of the divorce, and 
the parties stipulated to the division of most items of personal 
property. (R. 227-28, 241-43, 282, 301-02, 347.) The parties 
presented evidence concerning th€» farm and water stock, certain 
residences owned by the parties, and debts related to the farm. 
On January 17, 1996, the court issued its memorandum decision 
awarding the farm to Husband, the Sutherland homes to Wife, denying 
any credit for a premarital tax debt of Husband's which was paid by 
Wife, denying any alimony, and denying Wife any recovery on a 
claimed rental agreement against Intervenors. (R. 84-76.) The 
formal Decree of Divorce (R. 96-94) and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 93-85) were entered February 28, 1996. 
On February 29, 1996, Wife served a Motion to Amend Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. (R. 101-97.) 
On October 13, 1996, the trial court granted the motion and ordered 
the decree amended to provide that the parties should retain their 
separate property and debts brought into the marriage, consisting 
of $51,000.00 of equity Wife brought into the marriage and 
$20,256.72 of debt which Husband contributed. The court also 
awarded Wife judgment against Intervenors for rental payments, 
awarded Wife alimony of $175.00 per month, and made other minor 
adjustments. (R. 147-44.) An Amended Decree of Divorce (R. 170-
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165) and Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 164-
152) were entered on November 1, 1996. 
On November 27, 1996, both Husband (R. 178-177) and 
Intervenors (R. 181-180) filed notices of appeal. On January 28, 
1997, Husband also filed a Motion for Relief Under Rule 60(b)(1) 
and Rule 62(b) U.R.C.P. (Document appears in the record but has 
not been given index numbers.) The motion was denied following a 
hearing on June 17, 1997. (Minute entry appears in the record but 
has not been assigned an index number.) 
C. Statement Of Facts. Husband and Wife were married 
October 24, 1987. (R. 201.) At the time of the marriage, Wife was 
working and making $13.00 per hour (R. 296), had money in the bank 
(R. 295, 335) and had $51,000.00 equity in her home. (R. 163, f 
6.) Husband was working and making approximately $14.00 per hour 
(R. 296), but owed approximately $2 0,000.00 to the Internal Revenue 
Service. (R. 270.) 
After the marriage, the parties lived in Wife's home in 
Southgate, California. (R. 203.) They refinanced the home in 
December, 1987, to obtain money to pay Husband's IRS debt. (R. 
204.) 
The parties experienced several separations during the 
marriage. The initial separation was in 1990. Their final 
separation was in June, 1994. (R. 204.) 
The parties purchased several properties during their 
marriage. In September, 1988, they purchased a home in Delta, 
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Utah, from Interveners• (R. 216, Exhibit 4.) In March, 1990, they 
purchased a 70-acre farm in Millard County. (R. 219, Exhibit 5.) 
In connection with the purchase of the farm, they also purchased 62 
shares of Melville water stock and 3 0 shares of Deseret water 
stock. (R. 223, Exhibit 7.) Finally, in June, 1993, they 
purchased a small home in Sutherland, Utah. (R. 221, Exhibit 6.) 
An additional two shares of Deseret water stock were purchased as 
part of the Sutherland home. (R. 157, \ 27.) 
Wife's health started to fail in 1990. She continued to work 
for a time, but in November, 1992, stopped working and went on 
disability. (R. 215.) At the time of trial, Wife was 51 years old 
and was under a doctor's care for high blood pressure, pituitary 
gland tumor, depression, asthma and sleep apnea. She previously 
had a stroke. She was taking seven different types of medications. 
(R. 202.) Wife lived with her parents and received food and 
clothing worth more than $150.00 to $200.00 per month from them. 
(R. 203, 213, 256.) Because of her poor health, Wife tired very 
easily and was easily depressed and was mentally not responsible 
for her actions. (R. 255.) Wife's mother had therefore been 
appointed by Social Security to manage all of Wife's finances. (R. 
202, 254-55.) 
Husband was in good health at the time of the divorce. (R. 
203.) He asserted that he had attempted to find work but had been 
unsuccessful. (R. 280.) At the time of the divorce, he worked 
once a week at a livestock auction, making $25.00 each time. (R. 
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267.) He also worked on the farm. His testimony concerning the 
profitability of the farm was confusing, but he claimed to be 
making $9,000.00 per year. (R. 262-63, 288.) He also receives 
about $250.00 per month from a rental home which he inherited. (R. 
248, 276.) The trial court found that he was able-bodied and 
imputed income of $736.67 per month to him. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wife's contribution to the marriage included $51,000 of equity 
in her home. Husband's contribution was over $20,000 of debt. It 
was proper for the trial court to adjust for these premarital 
contributions. The property division is approximately equal after 
the premarital contributions are considered, and does not show an 
abuse of discretion. 
Permanent alimony was justified. Wife was seriously ill and 
unable to obtain employment. Husband was able bodied and was 
awarded income producing assets. The alimony award was supported 
by the necessary findings and within the court's discretion. 
Intervenors have not shown that the award of the farm and 
water stock to Husband was clearly erroneous. There is evidence to 
support the finding that the farm was owned by the parties. Even 
if Intervenors' names were on the farm title, the evidence showed 
that was only to assist the parties in obtaining a loan and was not 
intended to pass title. 
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The judgment to Wife on the rental agreement was supported by 
competent evidence. The judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed in all respects. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROPERTY DIVISION ADJUSTED FOR THE 
PARTIES7 PREMARITAL POSITIONS AND DID 
NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The trial court awarded Wife the Sutherland home, which was 
not subject to any liens,2 and awarded to Husband the farm and the 
associated water stock, which was income producing property. (R. 
262-63, 281, 285.) Husband now challenges that division, claiming 
that it results in a total value to Wife of $70,587.00 as 
contrasted to a negative $509.00 to Husband. (Husband/s brief, pp. 
7-8.) This argument is misleading because it ignores the parties7 
premarital positions. 
"As a general rule, equity requires that each party retain the 
separate property he or she brought into the marriage." Haumont v. 
Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), The trial court 
found, and Husband has not challenged that finding, that Wife came 
into the marriage with $51,000.00 of equity in the Southgate home, 
plus a substantial amount of money in the bank. Husband's 
2
 The parties did borrow money to purchase the home, but the 
loan was secured by water stock used on the farm and not by the 
home. (R. 210.) 
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premarital position, in contrast, was a $20,256.72 debt to the IRS. 
The trial court expressly acknowledged the rule that the parties 
should retain their separate property and debts brought into the 
marriage and made a property settlement which adjusted for that. 
(R. 146.) When the summary from page 8 of Husband's brief is 
adjusted for the premarital positions, it reveals that the trial 
court equally divided the parties' marital property. Subtracting 
Wife's premarital equity from the net property award described on 
page 8 of Husband's brief yields a net property award of 
$19,587.00. Adjusting for Husband's premarital debt, by adding 
that debt to his award, yields a net property division of 
$19,747.72 to Husband, which is more than that awarded to Wife. 
The property division must also be considered in light of the 
fact that Husband was healthy and able to work, and was awarded the 
parties' only income producing asset. Wife was disabled and 
dependent upon disability income and charity from her parents. The 
division of the parties' property was well within the trial court's 
discretion. 
Husband also claims the property division is not supported by 
the court's findings. There is no question that paragraphs 22 and 
23 of the findings contain a misstatement of fact, and that the 
misstatement does not support the court's conclusion. A review of 
the procedural history of the case, however, demonstrates that the 
error is clerical only. The court's initial decision following 
trial did not adjust for the parties' premarital position. The 
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court equally divided the parties'' existing assets. Paragraphs 22 
and 2 3 of the findings were prepared at that time,. Wife then moved 
to amend the findings and the decree to adjust for the premarital 
positions. The trial court granted the motion and added additional 
findings, including paragraphs 6 and 8 of the findings. Paragraphs 
22 and 2 3 were not modified in the final document, which was 
prepared by Wife's counsel. Although the error exists, it is clear 
from the findings what the trial court intended. When the obvious 
clerical error is removed from consideration, the findings fully 
support the trial court's conclusions. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE STATUTORY 
FACTORS IN AWARDING ALIMONY. 
The trial court ordered Husband, who was able-bodied and who 
was awarded the parties' only income producing asset, to pay 
alimony of $175.00 per month to Wife, who was disabled and 
dependent upon public assistance. The alimony was to continue 
until Wife remarried, cohabited, or became otherwise not legally 
entitled to the alimony. (R. 168.) Husband claims that this 
provision violates Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (Supp. 1997), 
which states: 
Alimony may not be ordered for a duration 
longer than the numb€>r of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of 
time. 
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The trial court complied with this statute. Paragraph 7 of 
the findings reflects the court's consideration of the statutory 
factors. The court found that Wife was disabled. The evidence 
showed that she was receiving state disability and also being 
assisted by her parents in an amount in excess of $150.00 to 
$200.00 per month. She was physically, emotionally, and mentally 
unable to handle her finances or support herself. Husband, in 
contrast, was able-bodied, had received the parties7 income 
producing asset, and had historically earned more than Wife. The 
parties had been married for nine years at the time the decree was 
entered. 
The statute does not specify exactly what "extenuating 
circumstances" will qualify for extension of alimony longer than 
the length of the marriage, and case law has not yet defined those 
factors. One of those factors certainly should include, however, 
the circumstance present here. Wife was ill, and there was no 
indication other than that the illness was permanent. This was not 
a situation where the wife would be able to return to work after 
receiving alimony to assist her in education and job training. 
Wife was permanently disabled. Wife was 51 years old at the time 
of trial (R. 2 02) and therefore 52 years old at the time the decree 
was entered. Continuing the alimony for only the same number of 
years as the marriage would have resulted in alimony terminating 
when Wife was approximately 61 years old. The possibility of a 
disabled person obtaining employment at the age of 61 years is 
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slim. There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court ordering 
that alimony continue. 
POINT III 
THE AWARD OF ALL OF THE FARM AND WATER STOCK 
TO HUSBAND WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Intervenors challenged the trial court's award of all of the 
70-acre farm and 3 0 shares of Deseret water stock to Husband. 
Intervenors asked the court to correct the claimed error by 
awarding the farm and the 30 shares of Deseret water stock equally 
to Husband and to Intervenors. Although this issue technically 
concerns only Husband, Wife addresses it because it may affect the 
overall equity of the property settlement. 
Husband challenges the trial court's finding in paragraph 11 
of the Findings of Fact, that Husband and Wife purchased the farm. 
In order to challenge the finding, Intervenors were required to 
show that the trial court's factual findings were clearly 
erroneous. Intervenors were required to marshal1 all the evidence 
supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the finding lacked 
support. American Rural Cellular. Inc. v. Systems Communication 
Corp., 318 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Ct. App. May 30, 1997). 
Marshalling the evidence would have revealed the following: 
Wife testified that she and Husband purchased the farm. (R. 219-
220.) No other evidence was presented at trial concerning the 
status of the title to the farm. There was testimony concerning 
the names on the water stock (R. 315), but no similar testimony 
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concerning the names on the farm title. The most that parents 
testified was that they had a "substantial financial investment" in 
the farm (R. 316) , and that they claimed "an interest" in the farm. 
(R. 318.) There was testimony that the water stock was put in the 
four names in connection with obtaining a loan. (R. 322, 343.) 
There was no corresponding evidence concerning the title on the 
farm. Intervenors testified concerning payments they made on the 
farm, but Wife disagreed with that testimony. (R. 341-342.) The 
evidence on which Intervenors now rely, a copy of the plat map, was 
simply an exhibit attached to an appraisal on the farm (Exhibit 
15) , and was not called to the court's attention nor offered as 
evidence of the title on the farm. 
More importantly, even if Intervenors' names were on the 
title, that did not compel awarding the farm to them. There was 
evidence that their names were put on the water stock solely in 
connection with obtaining a loan, and if their names were on the 
land title also, it was presumably for only the same purpose. It 
is well established that a divorce court may distribute property 
among the parties regardless of the status of the title. Jackson 
v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 1980). Outside a divorce, 
courts will implement the intent of the parties notwithstanding a 
deed which appears absolute on its face. Bown v. Loveland, 678 
P.2d 292, 297 (Utah 1984). 
If Intervenors were on the deed in this case, the evidence 
supports the conclusion that their names were there only for the 
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purpose of obtaining a loan. The trial court did specifically find 
that the Interveners' contributions to the farm and water stock 
were minimal compared with the value, and found that giving the 
Intervenors an interest in just the water stock still resulted in 
a significant windfall to them. (R. 159, f 20.) Intervenors have 
not challenged this finding, and it is amply supported by the 
evidence. The decision of the trial court awarding the farm to 
Husband should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT ON 
THE RENTAL AGREEMENT. 
Wife testified that Alma Broderick, one of the Intervenors, 
signed a rental agreement in favor of Husband regarding the Delta 
home. (R. 211, 333-335.) It was undisputed that Intervenors had 
not paid the rent required by the agreement. Because the Delta 
home was owned by Husband and Wife jointly, the rent owed on that 
home was part of the marital property and subject to division by 
the court. See Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1986) (court 
has power to divide property regardless of how titled). 
Intervenors now claim the rental agreement was abandoned. 
Abandonment must be shown by clear and unequivocal evidence, and 
requires proof of an intentional relinquishment of one's rights in 
the contract. Timpanocros Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481, 
484 (Utah 1975). Accord Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings 
& Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993) (proof of waiver must 
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be distinct). This court should also consider that the parties to 
the contract are presumed to be have intended what the contract 
said. Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 541-42 
(192 3) (The law "judges of his intentions by his outward 
expressions and excludes all questions in regard to his unexpressed 
intention. If his words or acts, judged by a reasonable standard, 
manifest an intention to agree to the matter in question, that 
agreement is established, and it is immaterial what may be the real 
but unexpressed state of his mind upon the subject.") (citation 
omitted). This court should presume that the parties did not 
intentionally enter into an agreement which was a nullity. The 
trial court found the contract was validly entered, and that the 
debt remained unpaid. The evidence supports these findings, and 
the judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court carefully considered the evidence ana reacn a 
property division which adjusts for the parties7 premarital 
positions and is fair and equitable. Appellants have not shown 
that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous, or that the 
trial court abused its discretion. This Court should affirm. 
DATED this 2 & day of August, 1997. 
DON R. PETERSEN and A 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
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